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Abstract
Derailments of freight trains carrying bulk cargo are not a new phenomenon in the United
States; they have occurred since the 19th century when the first shipment made its way
across the nation. However, despite sweeping changes in the past decade to the structure
of emergency management in the United States, how the railroads have responded to
derailments has not changed. The railroad culture is to operate lean, meaning few people
are needed to transport large quantities of cargos and commodities. When a derailment
occurs, the culture does not change, and railroads respond with typically few of their own
personnel to oversee response operations. The slowness with which railroads have acted
to adopt the National Incident Management System (NIMS) / Incident Command System
(ICS) had not become a concern until recently with the increasing number of crude oil
derailments. As the volume of crude oil transported by rail is predicted to rise
exponentially as it has over the past five years, the need to assess the suitability of
NIMS/ICS for derailments becomes even stronger. This paper addresses the incidentand organizational-specific characteristics found by researchers to support the use of
NIMS/ICS in planning and response operations and how those characteristics compare
with those found in Class I railroads and bulk crude oil derailment response operations.
By understanding these differences and the gaps they create, the railroads and
governmental organizations may be able to bridge those gaps more collaboratively and
effectively.

Keywords: railroads, NIMS, ICS, derailment, crude oil, Bakken, incident management
system
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I. Introduction
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), promulgated in 2003,
directed all levels of government to adopt and use the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) for emergency planning, response, and recovery operations (Department
of Homeland Security, 2003). Since its promulgation, multiple researchers have studied
the effectiveness of NIMS within different incident contexts (Anderson, Compton, &
Mason, 2004; Annelli, 2006; Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014;
Moynihan, 2008a). However, no research has been focused on the effectiveness of NIMS
and its main component, the Incident Command System (ICS), for responses to train
derailments involving bulk crude oil. Research does contend that NIMS/ICS may not be
appropriate for all incidents but is most suitable for routine and local emergencies
(Bennett, 2011; Moody, 2010). While only public response agencies are required to use
NIMS/ICS, the expectation of those responders that non-public responders use it as well
is cause for concern.
For the railroad community, the expectation to use NIMS and ICS is a challenge
as railroads have acted independently and effectively in the past to plan for, respond to,
recover from, and remediate derailment sites without stringent oversight or a mandated
incident management system (Anderson et al., 2004; Association of American Railroads,
2014a, 2015b, 2015c; Spraggins, 2010). Very little literature exists confirming that one
system can and should be used for all types of incidents, and an ineffective command and
control structure adds risk to an already high risk operation (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Buck et al., 2006; Knapp & Lunsford, 2004; Moody, 2010).
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Background
On July 6, 2013, a 72-car train, while left unattended, rolled downhill into the
small Canadian town of Lac-Mégantic, derailed, overturned, and exploded (Campbell,
2013). Crews required two days to extinguish the fire (Wells & Hutchins, 2013). The
derailment, unlike the majority of derailments that happen in remote stretches of track or
in the rail yard, directly impacted the town of 6,000 residents (Wells & Hutchins, 2013).
The incident damaged several blocks of businesses and homes and killed 47 people
(Campbell, 2013; Wells & Hutchins, 2013). The 72 cars were carrying 7.7 million liters
(2 million gallons) of light crude oil (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2014).
Crude oil represents an exponentially increasing railway transport commodity due to the
rapid increase of hydraulic-fracturing activities throughout the United States and the slow
pace of pipeline construction (Association of American Railroads, 2015d; Nelson, 2013;
Sussman, 2013).
Since 2008, Class I railroads, defined as railroads with the largest operating
revenue, have seen a 5,100 percent increase in the amount of bulk crude oil they are
transporting across the United States (Association of American Railroads, 2015d). To
save time and money, the crude oil is moved primarily by unit trains—trains that are
typically a mile long that consist solely of one type of commodity, including crude oil
(Frittelli et al., 2014; Werner, 2015). Derailments of these unit trains often results in fires
and has led to incidents including that experienced in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, and the
evacuations of several towns including Casselton, North Dakota (2013) and Mount
Carbon, West Virginia (2015) (Earth Justice, 2015).
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Due to high visibility and increasing governmental oversight of railroad
derailment response, railroads are now being expected to use NIMS/ICS as their incident
management system (IMS) (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
2014). The expectation to use NIMS/ICS as the standard railroad response framework is
cause for concern because railroads have not been required to use it in the past and are
likely unprepared to implement it during a response. Moreover, there may be solid
reasons why NIMS/ICS is not the best tool for responding to derailments of crude oil.
Perspective
This thesis examines the characteristics of railroad organizations, specifically
planning and response operations for crude oil derailments, to determine if they are
aligned with those characteristics found by researchers to be most suitable for the use of
NIMS/ICS. I became interested in the use of ICS during my career in the United States
Coast Guard (USCG). As a former Marine Safety Officer, I began responding to
maritime disasters and oil spills in 1990 and started to use the National Interagency
Incident Command System (the predecessor to NIMS) in 1995. When NIMS/ICS
became a formalized process for the entire Coast Guard in 2004, I observed the
difficulties experienced by the change in response systems for the law enforcement
officers, search and rescue teams, and vessel and aircraft operators. After retiring from
the USCG in 2012 as a qualified Type 1 Incident Safety Officer and Type 3 Incident
Planning Section Chief, I began working with a few Class I railroads to prepare for and
respond to derailments of hazardous materials (hazmat1) and crude oil2. At that time,

A hazardous material is defined by the Department of Transportation as a “substance or
material…capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in
commerce” (49 CFR §105.5, 2011).
1
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most of the railroads had not formally adopted NIMS/ICS but operated using existing
emergency response plans and a core group of hazmat officers, contractors (e.g.,
wrecking crews), and consultants (e.g., health and safety, air monitoring). During the
Paulsboro, New Jersey, derailment in 2012 that led to an evacuation due to the release of
toxic materials, I observed how the involved railroad implemented NIMS/ICS and the
challenges that were encountered.
Previous positive experiences with NIMS/ICS led me to presume falsely that
NIMS/ICS could be easily adopted by the railroads. Despite the challenges, Class I
railroads are working to implement NIMS/ICS as demonstrated by the Transportation
Rail Incident Preparedness & Response: Flammable Liquid Unit Trains (2015) training
curriculum developed by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In
response to previous crude oil derailments, this training was developed in collaboration
with other federal agencies, the Association of American Railroads, and Transportation
Community Awareness and Emergency Response (TransCAER) (Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, 2014). As described in the Chapter II literature review,
no research is available regarding the use of NIMS/ICS for responding to crude oil
derailments or its effectiveness in these scenarios. Therefore, there is a gap in the
understanding of what components of NIMS/ICS make it more or less suitable for
responding to derailments of crude oil. Similarly, there is a gap in the understanding of
the cause of the disconnect between the expectations of NIMS/ICS proponents and its

2

Crude oil is defined as “a mixture of hydrocarbons that existed in liquid phase in underground reservoirs
and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through surface separating facilities and which has
not been processed through a crude oil distillation tower. Included are reconstituted crude petroleum, and
lease condensate and liquid hydrocarbons produced from tar sands, gilsonite, and oil shale” (15 CFR
§754.2, 2012).

5
actual use by the railroads. These gaps, if better understood, could reduce delays in
initiating an on-site incident management system, miscommunication, and frustration
between responders. My research explores these gaps and recommends a path forward
for the railroad community and public first responders.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to expand on the current level of understanding
emergency managers and first responders have regarding planning for and responding to
derailments of bulk crude oil cargos that result in a spill. In particular, this study explores
the incident- and organizational-specific characteristics of crude oil derailments and
compares and contrasts those characteristics with characteristics identified as enabling the
use of NIMS/ICS. The data from this research may be used to educate emergency
managers and first responders regarding issues involving planning for and responding to
bulk crude oil derailments, the challenges railroads face when employing NIMS/ICS, and
the manner in which preparedness activities may remove or lower the barriers to
implementing NIMS/ICS successfully during crude oil derailments.
Significance for Emergency Management
This research is important to the field of Emergency Management because it
identifies issues in the implementation of NIMS/ICS during derailments of bulk crude oil.
I also make recommendations regarding strategies to overcome the identified issues.
Furthermore, this project challenges the underlying assumption made by the Department
of Homeland Security when it stated NIMS could provide “a systematic, proactive
approach to guide … agencies at all levels of government, …, and the private sector to
work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the
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effects of incidents, regardless of size, location or complexity” (Department of Homeland
Security, 2008, p. 1). Included within this assumption were numerous incident types
where the suitability of NIMS/ICS had not been studied or assessed, including
derailments. Therefore, understanding how the characteristics of planning for and
responding to derailments differ from those found in incidents where NIMS/ICS has been
successfully used is essential for the advancement of NIMS/ICS implementation within
railroad organizations. This information will assist railroad emergency response planners
and responders in recognizing when the characteristics of an incident are not well-aligned
with those found to facilitate the use of NIMS/ICS. Identifying when to apply NIMS will
result in minimizing overall risk to all responders.
Governmental agencies and other organizations responding to derailments of
crude oil will become more familiar with the characteristics of bulk crude oil derailment
planning and response operations. Additionally, they will obtain a better understanding
of how these characteristics make NIMS/ICS more or less suitable as an IMS through the
application of my findings. This knowledge will assist these agencies and organizations
in planning for and responding to derailments of crude oil as they will have a more
complete understanding of the differences between routine incidents and crude oil
derailments. They will also better understand what obstacles the railroads face in using
NIMS/ICS. This understanding may lead to modifications in the existing IMS to
facilitate its use by responders for derailments of crude oil.
Research Question
NIMS/ICS has provided a suitable framework for many response organizations,
but the railroads have not universally found this to be the case. This research questions
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examined are: 1. What are the key incident and organizational characteristics
researchers have found to be essential for NIMS/ICS to work as intended? 2. Are those
characteristics aligned with the characteristics of incidents involving derailments of bulk
crude oil that result in a spill and Class I railroads?
Summary
This chapter introduced the issues surrounding crude oil derailments and
examined the need for research in the areas of transportation of bulk crude oil by rail and
derailments of such cargos. The researcher, having had prior emergency response and
management positions while serving in the United States Coast Guard (1990–2012) and
as a consultant to railroads (2012–2015) became interested in the applicability of
NIMS/ICS for all types of incidents after responding to a hazardous materials derailment
in 2012 where the difficulties of implementing NIMS/ICS were witnessed. This research
will inform the field of Emergency Management because it uncovers gaps in the
implementation and use of NIMS/ICS during bulk crude oil derailments and examines the
question as to whether the characteristics of derailments and railroads align with the
characteristics found by researchers to be needed for NIMS/ICS to be effective.

II. Literature Review
This chapter reviews the literature pertaining to the transportation of bulk crude
oil by rail, the safety concerns surrounding that transportation, and the recent events that
have drawn attention to the issue. Next, it examines prior research regarding NIMS/ICS
and the characteristics of the incident and of the responding agencies that make its
implementation effective. Lastly, this chapter outlines the gaps in current literature as
they relate to this study. These topics were explored using electronic database searches
in Google, Google Scholar, Academic Search Complete, and ProQuest by means of
different configurations of the following terms: derailments, railroads, crude oil, Bakken
crude oil, effectiveness of NIMS/ICS, and responses to train accidents. Incident-specific
details were gathered using publically available federal investigative reports and after
action reports. After a thorough literature search, no research was found on the use of
NIMS/ICS during bulk crude oil derailments or how effective NIMS/ICS is for these
types of incidents.
Overview of Rail Transportation of Bulk Crude Oil
Rail transportation started in 1830 with the first steam locomotive which was
developed by Colonel John Stevens and chartered by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company (Association of American Railroads, 2015a). The rail industry, comprised of
privately-owned companies with federal oversight, continued to grow and expand and
soon became a leader in the movement of commodities as well as passengers (Werner,
2015). However, around 1980 the industry began to go bankrupt due to a decreasing
demand for services and overly strict federal regulations (Werner, 2015). To salvage the
remaining survivors, Congress deregulated the industry and allowed railroads to let go of
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money-losing routes and merge with one another (Werner, 2015). The outcome was a
convergence of the existing forty railroads to an oligopoly of seven Class I and
numerous, smaller Class II and III railroads (Werner, 2015).
The seven Class I railroads are still privately-owned companies with nearly all of
their regulations coming from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) within the
Department of Transportation (DOT) (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). The FRA governs such
areas as the safety of transporting hazmat, training of train crews, operating practices,
signaling and train control standards, and infrastructure (e.g., track, equipment) integrity
(Federal Railroad Administration, 2015a). Although they are privately owned, railroads
cannot deny service based on the commodity to be moved or its perceived risk. This is
because the DOT classifies railroads as “common carriers” and as such requires them to
carry all freight, including hazmat, as long as the shippers are reasonable and follow the
regulations governing packing and transportation of the goods (Common Carrier
Transportation, Service and Rates Act, 1995).
Railroads are “classed” by their operating revenue, a definition which changes
periodically (Association of American Railroads, 2015a). In 2013, for example, United
States (U.S.) Class I railroads were defined as line haul freight railroads with at least
$467 million in operating revenue (Association of American Railroads, 2015a). Class I
railroads own 70 percent of the tracks, employ 90 percent of railroad personnel, and
collect 95 percent of freight railroad revenue (Frittelli et al., 2014). Class II and III
railroads typically have shorter rail lines that service areas not on the main track routes,
and in the case of oil drilling sites, are frequently involved in the transportation of the oil
as drilling often occurs at remote sites not connected to the main lines (Frittelli et al.,
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2014). Many of the Class II and III tracks were those abandoned by the Class I railroads,
and their infrastructure has not been well maintained due to a lack of capital (Frittelli et
al., 2014; Werner, 2015). The Class I railroads, on the other hand, are allowed and have
the resources to build additional tracks and terminals to meet the demands of their
customers.
It is estimated that rail moves 40 percent of the goods in the United States, and 60
percent of the more volatile crude oil produced in the Bakken Formation located
predominantly in North Dakota and Montana (Johnson, 2015; Werner, 2015). While oil
only makes up 1.6 percent of the total number of car loads originated by the Class I
railroads, it accounts for 11 percent of the total amount of oil produced in the United
States (Association of American Railroads, 2015d). With the expansion in hydraulicfracturing operations throughout the North American shale deposits, rail has seen an
exponential increase in the volume of oil moved. In 2008, just before the spike in oil
production, Class I railroads originated 9,500 car loads of crude oil; in 2014 that number
jumped to 493,146 car loads (a 5,100 percent increase over six years) (Association of
American Railroads, 2015d).
The current boom in oil production is not the first time railroads have had a large
part in transporting crude oil. When the United States started to drill for oil in earnest
during the mid-19th century, railroads were quickly employed in the movement of crude
oil from the “Oil Region” (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015, p. 954) since they had already
established means to transport goods in northwestern Pennsylvania to the United States
and European markets. Rail lines were limited, however, and oil producers found it to be
both costly and hazardous to move manually barrels of oil to the nearest rail line (Klass &
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Meinhardt, 2015). Although it took many years, primarily due to laws regarding eminent
domain that applied to railroads but not pipelines and the political influences of the
railroad, pipelines began to transport crude oil in 1865 (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). This
opened the floodgate of pipelines that soon began to crisscross the nation; by 1879, a
115-mile long, six-inch-wide crude oil pipeline connected western Pennsylvania to the
east coast, where the oil could then be moved by rail to New York (Klass & Meinhardt,
2015). With the cost savings realized by the pipelines, oil producers continued to build
oil pipelines at record rates, laying 6,800 miles of pipe by 1900, thereby removing the
need to use railroads for the bulk of the transportation (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015).
The railroad did not regain the crude oil market until recently with the rekindling
of United States drilling made possible with hydraulic-fracturing. Fortunately for the
railroads, the shale deposits where drilling occurs are within range of many of the
existing rail lines—remote areas where pipelines do not already exist, including Montana,
North Dakota, Arkansas, and northern Texas (Energy from Shale, 2015; Frittelli et al.,
2014). As noted by Frittelli et al. (2014) in their Congressional report concerning rail
transportation of crude oil, “railroads are a viable alternative to pipeline transportation
largely because they offer greater flexibility. The nation’s railroad network is more
geographically extensive than the oil pipeline network, and better able to ship crude oil
from new areas of production” (p. 5). Being positioned to support the oil market has
resulted in railroads investing billions of dollars to expand and improve their main rail
lines and equipment to meet the growing needs. For example, BNSF Railway announced
that in 2014 it completed, for the third year in a row, record investments into expanding
existing infrastructure ($1.03 billion) and added 613 new locomotives, 7,000 new
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employees, and 7,500 new railcars for a total capital expenditure of 5.5 billion dollars
(BNSF, 2015). On the other hand, pipelines require an extensive approval process under
both state and federal laws, and the time needed for their construction exceeds that
needed to lay new track (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015).
With the growing demand to haul bulk crude oil from the inland, remote
hydraulic-fracturing sites to coastal port terminals and refineries (45 percent of which are
located in the Gulf Coast), railroads have begun to use unit trains (Association of
American Railroads, 2015d; Frittelli et al., 2014; Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). Unit trains
are trains made up of car loads hauling one commodity, range from 75 to more than 100
cars long, and can carry approximately 70,000 barrels (nearly 3 million gallons) of oil
(Association of American Railroads, 2015d; Werner, 2015). This configuration allows
railroads to keep the cost of transportation down as they only need to load and off-load
once and do not need to stop en route to their destination (Association of American
Railroads, 2015d; Werner, 2015). This concerns many environmental and public safety
activists who believe that unit trains of crude oil increase the risk of a derailment and will
increase the severity of one if it does occur (Abbasi, 2015; Johnson, 2015; Kolpack &
MacPherson, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Wronski, 2015). After the Galena, Illinois, derailment
in March, 2015, one coalition leader stated she was “disturbed” by the fact that railcars
hauling crude oil transited through Chicago suburbs daily and that the risk they posed
was “unbelievable” (Wronski, 2015, para. 23-24). Frittelli et al. (2014) note that the use
of unit trains does change the risk—on one hand moving a large, concentrated amount of
potentially flammable crude oil does increase the chances of fire and explosion if there is
a derailment, but on the other hand reduces the need for human interaction in rail yards
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where human error has been found to be the greatest causal factor for accidents (Liu, Saat
& Barkan, 2012). There are few options open to railroads to increase volumes moved.
Federal laws limit the number of trains on the tracks at one time; therefore, railroads
cannot simply build more locomotives or lease more rail cars to meet the demand
(Werner, 2015). However, double tracking (adding rail lines next to existing tracks) is an
option railroads are exploring to increase volume (Werner, 2015).
Another concern is the amount of hazmat that transits through major metropolitan
cities (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). Although consideration is given to routing trains
around cities, many of which were built around the original track routes, oftentimes
rerouting the trains increases the risk because the secondary tracks are not maintained as
well as the main tracks and using the secondary track increases the miles and track time
for the train (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). Moreover, the commodities being transported,
including crude oil, terminate at industrial parks located on the outskirts of the cities
making movement of cargos near or through cities necessary (Klass & Meinhardt, 2015).
Even with 160,000 miles of track, the railroads maintain a lean organizational
structure and rely heavily on contractors and consultants to support them when needed
(Association of American Railroads, 2016a; Friedlaender, Berndt, & McCullough, 1992).
A typical Hazmat and/or Environmental Response Department within a Class I railroad
may have few full-time employees but will maintain close relationships with heavy
equipment and wrecking contractors as well as hazmat and environmental consultants to
assist the railroad (Association of American Railroads, 2016b). This lean culture is seen
during response operations as well. For example, a unit train will have on-board one
conductor and an engineer (Knapp, Watson, & Frangella, 2008). They are the first
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responders for the railroad when there is an incident, but neither of them is usually
trained to do more than make an initial visual assessment and call the critical incident
desk to report the event (Knapp et al., 2008). Immediately upon notification, the on-call
emergency response team from the railroad (which is normally personnel from the
Hazmat Department) and their oil spill qualified individual (who is typically a member of
the department) will go onsite (Association of American Railroads, 2016b). As they are
traveling to the location, they make calls to their local contractors and consultants to meet
them at the incident site. These emergency response teams have few personnel. The inhouse response team may consist of three or four personnel who are supported by
contractors to do the labor and consultants to perform the administrative, logistical, and
support functions including safety and health and public affairs (Association of American
Railroads, 2016b).
Safety Concerns of Crude Oil Cargos
Crude by rail. Although the number of derailments of hazardous or flammable
cargo is low and communities are rarely impacted, incidents do occur. As noted by
Knapp and Lunsford (2004), the safety record of the railroads is extremely impressive
when compared to other modes of transport for bulk cargos. According to a study of 25
years of rail safety data, more than 99.99 percent of all hazmat are transported without
incident (Association of American Railroads, 2015c; Knapp & Lunsford, 2004). The
sudden growth in rail traffic, however, resulted not only in substantial expansion of
railroad infrastructure but in the number of accidents involving crude oil cargos (Kolpack
& MacPherson, 2013). Since the boom in shale hydraulic-fracturing drilling around
2009, there have been 12 noteworthy derailments (2013–2015) in the United States
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starting with the spill in Parkers Prairie, Minnesota, in March 2013 (Earth Justice, 2015).
Following Parkers Prairie, there were two more incidents in 2013, four in 2014, and five
in 2015 (Dobuzinskis, 2015; Earth Justice, 2015; Karlamangla, 2013).
Concerns about the transportation of crude oil by rail have been rising since the
Lac-Mégantic disaster and continue to build as more crude oil derailments resulting in
fires and explosions occur (Kolpack & MacPherson, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Vartabedian,
2015; Wronski, 2015). The Association of American Railroads (2015c) agrees, stating
that even though less than 0.01 percent of hazmat rail cars are involved in accidents, with
the recent number of incidents, the issue of safety has been questioned. Derailments of
crude oil usually result (about 66 percent of the time) in a fire, pollution, and on occasion,
explosions (Vartabedian, 2015). The outcome has been an increase in media coverage,
public outrage, and governmental oversight, including the expectation by public
responders for railroads to use NIMS/ICS during all response operations where there is
local, state, or federal involvement (Vartabedian, 2015). Due to the high visibility and
public attention, government involvement during crude oil incidents has become the
norm, not the exception.
After each major incident, the FRA and National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigate the causal and contributing factors of the incident (Federal Railroad
Administration, 2015a; National Transportation Safety Board, 2015). Most rail incidents
are caused by derailments (72 percent) resulting in the derailment of an average of seven
cars per accident (Liu et al., 2012). Investigations have found that the primary cause of
derailments is track failure due to broken rails or welds, track geometry (excluding wide
gauge), wide gauge (when the distance between the two rails goes beyond the prescribed
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56.5 inches), and buckled track (Liu et al., 2012; Vartabedian, 2015). Although it would
seem intuitive to think that the speed of the train could contribute to a derailment
occurring, investigations have not found a significant relationship (Liu et al., 2012).
Likewise, human error, which has been found to lead to siding and yard derailments, does
not rank in the top ten causes for main line derailments (Liu et al., 2012).
Unfortunately, recent events (see Table 1) have only reinforced the perceived
need for additional oversight and control. Just four months after the disaster at LacMégantic, on November 8, 2013, the Genesee & Wyoming Railroad had a train carrying
North Dakota light crude oil derail in a remote section of western Alabama, burst into
flames, and take several days to burn out (Sussman, 2013). Unlike Lac-Mégantic, no one
was injured or killed. The next month, just 25 miles from Fargo, North Dakota, a train
carrying crude oil collided with another train, derailed, and exploded (Kolpack &
MacPherson, 2013). Again, no one was injured or killed, but the local community
(approximately 2,400 residents) of Casselton, North Dakota, was asked to evacuate in
order to reduce their exposure to the gases and particulate matter in the smoke plume
(Kolpack & MacPherson, 2013). More recently, an explosion and large fire occurred on
a Monday afternoon, February 16, 2015, in Mount Carbon, West Virginia, when a unit
train carrying 109 rail cars derailed (Constantino & Murphy, 2015). This incident was
preceded by a derailment in Timmins, Ontario, just two days earlier that resulted in a fire
(Valentine, 2015).
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Table 1
Summary of U.S. Train Derailments of Bulk Crude Oil Resulting in a Spill (from January
2010 – December 2015)
Date

Railroad(s)
Involved
Canadian
Pacific

Unit train with crude oil derailed and
spilled 20,000-30,000 gallons of oil

November 8, Aliceville,
2013b
AL

Genesee &
Wyoming
(Class II)

90 car train of crude oil derailed, 25 cars
involved, caught fire, and spilled an
estimated 748,800 gallons of crude oil

December
30, 2013a

Casselton,
ND

BNSF

Train collision caused unit train of crude
oil to derail. Cars exploded and caught
fire. Town was evacuated. Estimated
400,000 gallons of crude spilled

January 31,
2014a

New
Canadian
Augusta, MS National

Unit train derailed, 13 cars involved,
estimated 90,000 gallons spilled. Nearby
residents were evacuated

February 13,
2014a

Vandergrift,
PA

Norfolk
Southern

130 car train carrying various cargos
including heavy crude oil, derailed and
spilled approximately 4,00 gallons

April 30,
2014a

Lynchburg,
VA

CSX

Unit train derailed, 25 cars involved,
exploded and caught fire. Nearby
residents were evacuated. 300,000
gallons of crude oil spilled

May 9,
2014a

LaSalle, CO

Union Pacific

100 car train derailed and spilled 5,300
gallons of crude oil

February 16,
2015a

Mount
Carbon, WV

CSX

Unit train with crude oil derailed, 26
cars involved, 20 cars ignited resulting
in explosions. Property damaged. Town
was evacuated

March 5,
2015a

Galena, IL

BNSF

103 car train of crude oil derailed
resulting in fire and oil spill

March 27,
2013a

Location
Parkers
Prairie, MN

Incident Summary
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May 6,
2015a

Heimdal,
ND

BNSF

109 car train of crude oil derailed, 5-10
cars exploded and caught fire. Town was
evacuated

July 16,
2015c

Culbertson,
MT

BNSF

106 car train of crude oil derailed and
spilled 35,000 gallons of crude oil.
Nearby residents were evacuated

Canadian
Pacific

110 car train with 109 cars of crude oil,
13 cars derailed spilling crude oil.
Nearby residents were evacuated

November 8, Watertown,
2015a
WI
a

Earth Justice, 2015
Karlamangla, 2013
c
Dobuzinskis, 2015
b

Emergency preparedness. Because removing all of the risk of transporting
crude oil is infeasible, transporters have stepped up emergency response preparations.
The Association of American Railroads (2015c) states that the railroads have prepared
with emergency response plans, training, exercises, and full-time teams of hazmat safety
and emergency response teams. Railroads have also agreed to voluntary safety measures
including using pre-trip risk assessments that consider 27 risk factors (using the Rail
Corridor Risk Management System software developed by the federal government in
partnership with the railroads), reducing speed of travel, rerouting certain trains around
cities, developing safety measures to improve track and equipment safety, more
frequently examining tracks, and implementing a faster braking system for the trains
(Association of American Railroads, 2014a; Gold & Stevens, 2014; McDonald, 2014).
Efforts have been made to improve railroad communication with communities including
notifying emergency responders when shipments of Bakken crude oil will transit their
area, working with local communities on emergency response plans that ensure they have
sufficient response capabilities to respond to a worst case discharge, assembling and
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staging response kits throughout high risk areas, and requiring the qualified person in
charge of the response to be on site within three hours of being notified of an accident
(Association of American Railroads, 2014b; Klass & Meinhardt, 2015; Werner, 2015).
Additionally, railroads have begun to fund training for local emergency responders at the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. in Pueblo, Colorado, sending more than 1,500
personnel in 2014 for training (Association of American Railroads, 2015b). In response,
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. developed a training program for train crews to
educate them on the types of hazmat they move and first responder actions at the
awareness level (Association of American Railroads, 2015b). Lastly, to ensure first
responders had access to training materials, in March 2015 a new, NIMS-compliant
crude-by-rail training course was developed and is now being offered online and in the
classroom by the railroads (Association of American Railroads, 2015b).
Safety concerns. Questions are often posed about the safety of tank cars used to
carry crude oil. The majority of cars are not owned by the railroads but by the shipper or
rail equipment leasing companies, and because railroads want less risk exposure, they
have lobbied for stricter federal tank car laws (Association of American Railroads,
2015b; Frittelli et al., 2014; Klass & Meinhardt, 2015). The concerns about the DOT-111
rail car, the type of car currently in service for shipping hazmat including crude oil,
appear to be warranted. The NTSB in their Railroad Accident Brief on the Tiskilwa,
Illinois, derailment and hazmat release and fire, cite five previous NTSB investigations
involving DOT-111 cars that resulted in hazmat being released and summarized their
findings by stating “the poor performance of DOT-111 general specification tank cars in
derailments suggests that DOT-111 tank cars are inadequately designed to prevent
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punctures or breaches and that catastrophic release of hazmat can be expected when
derailments involve DOT-111” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013, p. 9).
Although the Tiskilwa incident did not involve crude oil, it did draw attention to the risks
inherent to the use of DOT-111 cars for transporting hazmat. As a result, the news media
picked up on the safety concerns with DOT-111 cars and ignited the public’s interest and
demand for safer rail cars (Hays, 2014; Nelson, 2013).
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has listened to the railroads,
NTSB, media, and the public, and in May 2015 announced that the older style tank cars,
including DOT-111s, would be retrofitted in the next two years or phased out over the
next 10 years by DOT-117 cars which are designed with thicker shells, head shields one
half inch thick, jackets with a minimum 11-gauge steel, insulation, and re-closeable
pressure relief valves (Thomas, 2015). The cost to retrofit or renew the railcars is
estimated at $1.7 billion (Thomas, 2015).
In addition to the question about the safety of tank cars there is the new concern
about the types of crude oil being produced, especially in the Bakken Formation due to its
properties and the need to transport most of it by rail because of the lack of pipeline
infrastructure in that region (Dangerous Goods Transportation Consulting, 2014; National
Response Team, 2014). Crude oils are categorized by their American Petroleum Institute
(API) gravity as light, medium, or heavy with the light crude oils being more volatile
(i.e., contain more dissolved flammable gases including methane, ethane, butane and
propane), having a lower specific gravity, higher vapor pressure, and lower flash point
(Dangerous Goods Transportation Consulting, 2014; National Response Team, 2014).
Bakken crude oil, unlike the majority of crude oil produced, is “younger” and much of it
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is very light (i.e., containing more dissolved gases than other crude oils) with a mean
flashpoint of negative (-)16.8 degrees Fahrenheit (Dangerous Goods Transportation
Consulting, 2014). These characteristics make it more prone to ignite during a
derailment as the impact of the derailment creates enough energy and static discharge to
ignite the material (National Response Team, 2014).
Mitigation. Public attention came to the forefront after the Lac-Mégantic disaster
which involved Bakken crude oil because of the force of the explosions and the
subsequent fire (Gold & Stevens, 2014; Hays, 2014; National Response Team, 2014;
Nelson, 2013). American public outrage soon followed when two incidents involving
Bakken crude oil occurred within the next six months in Casselton, North Dakota, and
Aliceville, Alabama. On February 25, 2014, the DOT took the first step to address these
concerns by releasing an Emergency Order requiring that shippers test the crude oil
before assigning it a packing group (PG) number which is based on the physical
properties of the material (e.g., flash point, boiling point) (Gold & Stevens, 2014). This
has resulted in tank cars now being properly marked as high (PG I), medium (PG II), or
low hazard (PG III) (Dangerous Goods Transportation Consulting, 2014; Gold &
Stevens, 2014). Prior to this order, crude oil cargos were typically assigned the lowest
packing group (PG III) as the presumption had been that crude oil, as a whole, is
combustible but not flammable, and, therefore, had a small chance of igniting if released
(Dangerous Goods Transportation Consulting, 2014; Gold & Stevens, 2014).
Evolution of NIMS/ICS
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) by authority of Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic
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Incidents, directed all federal, state, tribal and local governments to adopt and implement
the National Incident Management System to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
all incidents (Department of Homeland Security, 2003). HSPD-5’s policy is:
To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a
single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The objective
of the United States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across
the Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a
national approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard
to domestic incidents, the United States Government treats crisis management and
consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than as two
separate functions. (Department of Homeland Security, 2003, para. 3)
The National Incident Management System (NIMS), designed for all sizes and types of
incidents, was soon thereafter implemented in 2004 (Department of Homeland Security,
2008).
NIMS was modeled after the FIRESCOPE system developed in the 1970s by
California firefighters and an outgrowth of that system called the National Interagency
Incident Management System (NIIMS) developed by agencies including the U.S. Forest
Service and U.S. Coast Guard (Buck et. al., 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Firefighters
and other responders within the government found NIIMS to be an effective disaster
management tool because it provided a standardized organization, processes, and order to
an otherwise chaotic situation (Annelli, 2006). With the 2004 revision, NIMS addressed
three areas that were missing in the initial doctrine including preparedness, resource
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management, and communications and information management (Annelli, 2006). Within
the preparedness component fall many of the critical elements needed to manage
effectively an incident including planning, training, exercises, responder qualification and
certification, equipment acquisition, and publication management (Annelli, 2006).
HSPD-5 limited its reach to governmental agencies meaning that the private
sector was free to adopt or not adopt NIMS/ICS as they saw fit (Department of Homeland
Security, 2003). DHS did, however, recognize the private sector as a key component in
response operations and included them in the National Incident Management System
doctrine (revised in 2008) stating that the system:
provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and
local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private
sector [emphasis added] to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size,
location, or complexity. (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 3)
Nevertheless, for many private sector companies and organizations, the requirement to
implement NIMS and its components, including ICS, did directly impact them.
For example, the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA) required fixed facilities to develop response plans that aligned with the local
emergency response plan which oftentimes required the use of NIMS/ICS as the IMS
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2015a, 2015b; National Transportation Safety Board,
2014). Because that requirement within EPCRA did not pertain to railroads, the
railroads, in a sense, fell through the cracks (National Transportation Safety Board,
2014). Stricter governmental oversight and the push to use NIMS/ICS arose soon after
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the Paulsboro, New Jersey, hazmat derailment in 2012 that resulted in the release of a
toxic by inhalation chemical prompting the community’s evacuation (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2014). As noted in their report, the NTSB (2014) explicitly
points out the disconnect stating that because railroads are not required to develop
contingency and response plans with local emergency responders, plans that would define
the IMS to be used, communities are left “unprepared” to respond to releases of hazmat
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2014, p. 50).
Suitability of NIMS/ICS for All Incidents
The effectiveness and efficiency of a response is often a result of the teamwork
and contingency planning performed by the carrier (Bennett, 2011; Deal, de Bettencourt,
Huyck, Merrick, & Mills, 2006). Railroads, having been their own first responders, have
systems in place to handle emergencies. These systems are conducted with few
personnel, including typically the hazmat officer, a railroad engineer, and third party
contractors to remove the materials, lift the cars back onto the track (if feasible), restore
the track’s structural integrity, and clean up the impacted environment (Association of
American Railroads, 2016b). On occasion the railroad is assisted by the local fire
department or other emergency responders depending on the location, affected cars,
severity, outcome, and materials involved (Knapp & Lunsford, 2004). On rare occasion,
the federal government is involved (e.g., when a navigable waterway is impacted or the
derailment has high visibility) (Federal Railroad Administration, 2015b). However, the
findings of the NTSB (2014) coupled with the exponential increase of crude oil cargos
and, although infrequent, devastating derailments, pushed railroads to adopt and
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implement NIMS/ICS as their IMS despite having responded effectively and efficiently
to past derailments without such requirements.
Many NIMS/ICS proponents and practitioners assume that because the IMS
works for their organization and performs as intended for their response operations that it
must be a suitable approach for all incidents (Johnson, 2015). Proponents of NIMS/ICS,
including Perry (2003), espouse the IMS’s flexibility, while others have found that its key
attributes of “common terminology… modular organization… management by
objectives… incident action plans… integrated communications [and] chain of
command” all contribute to its efficiency and effectiveness (Anderson et al., 2004, pp. 46; Bigley & Roberts, 2001).
Questionable assumptions. Since the implementation of NIMS/ICS in 2004,
many scholars have begun to question the assumptions made by NIMS/ICS proponents
that the IMS is suitable for all incidents (Jensen & Waugh, 2014; Moody, 2010).
Moynihan (2008a) notes that “while the ICS illustrates the potential for mixing
hierarchies and networks, it was mandated by policymakers willing to make broad
assumptions about the applicability of the ICS on limited evidence” (p. 205). Buck et al.
(2006) note that one way NIMS/ICS fails is by not focusing on the coordination needed
between all of the responding organizations before an incident occurs and, therefore, are
concerned about HSPD-5’s mandate. “If ICS is flawed, expansion of ICS usage may
exacerbate the difficulties in the organization of emergency response” (Buck et al., 2006,
p. 3). Additionally, Buck et al. (2006) point out that the context of the incident (i.e.,
incident scenario and responding organizations) where NIMS/ICS is effective had not
been examined prior to its implementation, and that this gap in understanding has made
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NIMS/ICS only partially effective. Moynihan (2008a) supports Buck et al.’s (2006)
assertions writing that there are crisis characteristics and management factors that directly
impact NIMS/ICS’s operation, factors that are not addressed in the IMS. These factors
are summarized below.
Shared vision and trust. With respect to the response organization, Buck et al.
(2006) found that NIMS/ICS was the most effective when the response organizations had
a “shared vision of the response through planning, practice, and experience” (p. 12) and
were a part of a community. These factors led to interagency trust and respect thus
allowing for potentially pre-existing, diverging perspectives and goals to align more
easily during a crisis so that decisions could be made collectively (Buck et al., 2006).
Similarly, Moynihan (2008b) found that NIMS/ICS supported response operations best
when there had been pre-incident coordination among the responding organizations to
develop plans that were flexible and incident-specific and considered available
resources—measures that fostered trust and delegation.
Related to this finding, researchers found that in addition to having plans, plans
with collaboratively developed and agreed upon risk assessments and tactics led to
NIMS/ICS being effectively used (Buck et al., 2006). Conversely, when there are
multiple or diverse organizations responding, ICS becomes more difficult to use due to a
lack of a previously formed network and prior coordination which may lead to distrust
and conflict (Moynihan, 2009). Lutz and Lindell (2008) express concern with using
NIMS/ICS when there are emergent, multi-agency responders that have never worked
with one another as they are performing “novel tasks with a new staff” (p. 124). Shared
experiences, training, and exercises allow responders to become more familiar with one
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another strengthening their underlying relationship, sense of partnership, and dependency
(Buck et al., 2006). Buck et al. (2006) also found that “prior familiarity with the people
and the response organizations [was cited as] the most important factor” (p. 13) in
determining if NIMS/ICS would work.
Commitment to NIMS/ICS. Research by Jensen and Waugh (2014) suggests
that there are other organizational factors influencing the effectiveness of NIMS/ICS
including the need for the individuals responding to be a part of team (e.g., first
responders) or perform emergency response as part of their paid duties and to have used
NIMS/ICS in prior exercises or responses. Individuals are best suited when their training
and experience using NIMS/ICS is frequent, comprehensive, and specific, and is
combined with an understanding of response strategies and tactics they will face (Buck et
al., 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014). In order for responders to attain this level of
experience, response organizations need to adopt NIMS/ICS committedly and
unreservedly throughout their entire organization (Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Lester
(2007) adds that committed leadership is in itself not sufficient (as demonstrated by the
failures experienced during the Hurricane Katrina response); rather, transformational
leadership is needed. Transformational leadership challenges assumptions about the
IMS, imparts among all response levels a shared vision, authorizes responders to make
decisions in the field, and encourages initiative (Lester, 2007). Once they have
committed themselves, organizations then need to demonstrate this commitment by
training employees including those in support functions, developing plans and standard
operating procedures that incorporate the IMS, exercising the plans, and completing after
action reviews of how well the organization performed so that corrective actions can be
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taken (Jensen & Waugh, 2014; Moynihan, 2008a). These elements combine to create an
“organizational memory” (Moynihan, 2008b, p. 359) upon which response decisions can
be more accurately made. Perry (2003) had similar findings stating that the IMS must be
used daily by the responders to lay the groundwork for future responses.
Uncertainty and complexity. Another factor affecting the effectiveness of
NIMS/ICS is the number of organizations responding to an incident as multi-agency
responses create additional uncertainty (Moynihan, 2008b, 2009). Buck et al. (2006)
propose that NIMS/ICS works well for firefighters because they are a community of
experienced responders who have trained and worked together to build their collective
technical competence and relationships; for large incidents with numerous response
organizations, this is not the case. Numerous organizations do not only add to the
uncertainty and complexity, they may undercut the response leadership (e.g., command
and general staff) because responders may not have an appreciation of the leaders’
experiences, knowledge, or skills, thereby leading to questions of their legitimacy and
resulting in responders questioning their work assignments (Jensen & Waugh, 2014;
Moynihan, 2009). Additionally, large incidents make the key NIMS/ICS component of
effective communications more difficult due to equipment interoperability issues and
differences in leadership communication styles (Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Lastly,
organizational size may hinder response flexibility and adaptability, a fundamental
principle for effective IMSs (Perry, 2003).
Incident characteristics. With respect to the type of incident for which
NIMS/ICS is being used, practitioners (Bennett, 2011; Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Knapp &
Lunsford, 2004) may argue that because it was designed as an “all-hazards” approach that
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NIMS/ICS is the best tool available for train derailment responses; however, Jensen and
Waugh (2014) and Buck et al. (2006) would disagree. Buck et al. (2006) note that ICS
works poorly for large or uncontrollable disasters that result in more than one hazard.
Likewise, large disasters often require a multi-agency response which may introduce
tension as each agency brings its own agenda (Buck et al., 2006). On the other hand,
during routine emergencies, in which the responders had a pre-incident network and
agreed upon understanding of the threats and response strategies and tactics, NIMS/ICS
performed effectively (Buck et al., 2006; Moynihan, 2009).
Complicating this issue is that incidents are more and more frequently crossing
geographical and political boundaries causing increased complexity and the “need for
extreme adaptation and unprecedented cooperation under conditions in which these are
most difficult to achieve” (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010, p. 204). Although not directly
related to derailments, other studies have found that effective preplanning and a thorough
understanding of how to respond by all responders are necessary to ensure the success of
ICS (Bennett, 2011; Jensen & Waugh, 2014; Moody, 2010; Perry, 2003). Chen,
Sharman, Rao, & Upadhyaya (2007, 2008) maintain that the number of operating
procedures and plans that can remain unchanged during an event enables responders to
use NIMS/ICS more effectively. Likewise, they note that for complex events to be
successful, the responders must have knowledge on how to respond to that type of event
and have performed pre-incident coordination to ensure all of the responders know each
other’s capabilities and capacities (Chen et al., 2007, 2008). Moynihan’s (2008a) case
study of how well NIMS/ICS worked during the Exotic Newcastle Disease outbreak in
2003 had similar findings indicating that responder experience for the type of incident
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was a function of how well the IMS worked. His study notes that a lack of experience
with the crisis at hand increases the demands placed on responders because they have to
learn new tasks while at the same time coordinating with other organizations to complete
the tasks (Moynihan, 2008a).
NIMS/ICS and derailments. Although the railroads have done extensive
preplanning, most of the local communities do not have the resources or knowledge of
how to respond to crude oil derailments and depend on the railroads for their expertise
(Association of American Railroads, 2016b; Knapp & Lunsford, 2004). Chen et al.
(2008) state that not only preplanning, but pre-incident coordination, is needed for ICS to
work as intended. This may not be a reasonable expectation for the railroads. With over
160,000 miles of track, the coordination of the railroads with the communities is typically
limited to those areas where there are large confluences of track or railroad operations
(e.g., rail yards, terminals) and in urban centers or environmentally sensitive areas (e.g.,
National Parks) (Association of American Railroads, 2016a). Compounding this issue is
one of frequency. Bennett (2011) states that incidents that have a high risk but low
frequency are of the most concern for responders as they have limited experience upon
which to draw and apply their training. Furthermore, as noted by Moynihan (2008b),
learning during a crisis is extremely difficult for responders and organizations as crises
“narrow focus and limit information processing” (p. 351) which can result in making
poor decisions as responders call upon past lessons learned that may or may not apply
which then leads to faulty reasoning. This can lead to stress and an inability to cope by
the first responders negatively impacting their response capabilities (Kim, 2007).
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Because the probability that local emergency responders will be involved in a
crude oil derailment response is low, but the risk of operations can be high, the need for
incident-specific response experience for NIMS/ICS to work is a concern. Furthermore,
the complexity of a derailment varies based on the train’s consist3, location of the
incident, status of the railcars (i.e., intact or breached), and presence or absence of fire
and explosions. Incident novelty and complexity create a difficult situation for local first
responders (Buck et al., 2006).
Generated Demands
Incident-specific characteristics can be defined as either response-generated or
agent-generated demands (Quarantelli, 1997). Response-generated demands are those
introduced by operations of the responding organizations while agent-generated demands
pertain to the incident itself (Quarantelli, 1997). Examples of each are described in Table
2. As stated by Quarantelli (1997), emergency managers and planners need to understand
the difference between response- and agent-generated demands to be effective.
Response-generated demands are those variables that can be influenced by an
organization prior to an incident, while agent-generated demands, although often
predictable, are uncontrollable (Quarantelli, 1997). This distinction is important when
considering how to prepare for and mitigate the threats associated with bulk crude oil
derailments; for example, some response-generated demands can be addressed
beforehand while planning may be the only tool available for agent-generated demands.

3

The consist is complete list of all of the cars and locomotives in the train including a description of the
cars, location of cars, and shipping papers for hazardous materials (National Transportation Safety Board,
2016b).
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Table 2
Demands Generated by Incidents
Response-Generated

Agent-Generated

Mobilizing people and equipment

Location, date and time of incident

Defining goal and objectives

Type of incident / material(s) involved

Developing strategies and tactics

Number of hazards

Delegating work assignments and tasks

Severity (threat) and complexity of
incident
Required number and type of tasks to be
performed by responders

Developing communication systems
Tracking information and documentation

Jurisdiction of first responders

Decision-making

Pace of incident

Organizing efforts and collaboration

Size of incident

Note. Data compiled by author using information from Quarantelli, 1997, p. 5
Upon comparison, several response- and agent-generated demands were found to
align with incident- and organizational-specific characteristics thought to enable the use
of NIMS/ICS. Characteristics that align with response-generated demands include:
1. Level of preplanning, training, and exercises directly related to derailment
response operations
2. Level of trust between responding organizations
3. Whether or not the different responding organizations shared a vision or common
purpose upon arriving to incident
4. Degree to which a network or contact had been made prior to the incident
5. Whether or not an accurate assessment of the hazards and their associated risks
had been made
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6. Whether or not responders recognize or understand the hazards and associated
risks
7. Level of training and experience of responders to incident type (e.g., being able to
develop and deploy strategies and tactics)
8. Level of training and experience of responders to NIMS/ICS
9. Availability of personnel and equipment needed for the response
10. Level of commitment by responding organizations’ senior leaders to NIMS/ICS
11. Level and effectiveness of communication at the site and in the command post
Characteristics that align with agent-generated demands include:
1. Proximity of incident to an urban area
2. Type of incident and whether it is novel or routine
3. Severity and complexity of the incident
4. Number of jurisdictions involved in the incident
5. The number of tasks required to respond to and resolve incident
6. How quickly the incident evolves or expands/contracts
7. How large the incident is (spatial size)
8. If the incident occurs on a jurisdictional boundary (i.e., spatial, temporal, political,
or functional)
Railroads have the ability to affect change with the first set of [response-generated]
demands, but can only anticipate, assess, and plan for the second [agent-generated].
Understanding the limitations railroads face when planning for and responding to
derailments allows for a more complete discussion as how to best support and prepare
first responders.
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Conclusions
The National Incident Management and Incident Command Systems provide
useful tools for many responders and have been readily adopted and successfully used by
many governmental organizations (Bennett, 2011; Bigley & Roberts, 2001). This is not
the case for railroads, however, who are struggling to implement the tools in a practicable
manner while still adhering to the NIMS doctrine (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, 2014). Historically, the Class I railroads have responded quickly
and effectively using a few internal personnel and a team of contractors and consultants
(Association of American Railroads, 2015c, 2016b). Recent events have led to greater
oversight by federal, state, and local agencies that have begun to expect the use of
NIMS/ICS by the railroad responders (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 2014).
Ever since responders began using NIM/ICS, researchers have tried to define
what factors are needed for it to work (Jensen & Waugh, 2014). As noted above, recent
research suggests that well-defined, routine, and simple incidents that involve few
response organizations who have a pre-incident history of coordination and cooperation
result in NIMS/ICS being more effectively used (Buck et al., 2006). Similarly, the IMS
is supported when inter-organizational relationships have already been built and they
share the same vision (Buck et al., 2006). Intra-organizationally, an IMS is best
supported when there is full commitment of the organization from the most senior leaders
down to the support personnel that is backed by plans, training, and exercises (Jensen &
Waugh, 2014). These incident- and organizational-specific characteristics are more
clearly understood when considered alongside Quarantelli’s (1997) research on response-
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generated and agent-generated demands. Focus, therefore, should be on how railroads
can develop or improve policies, programs, and procedures to affect change in their
response-generated demands, and on obtaining a clearer understanding of how their
agent-generated demands align with those found to facilitate the use of NIMS/ICS.
Summary
This chapter examined the issues surrounding transporting bulk crude by rail, the
history of NIMS/ICS, and the characteristics believed to support the use of NIMS/ICS
during a response. The literature review found that research to date does not appear to
address the use of an IMS with train derailments. Additionally, there is limited literature
on the efficacy of NIMS/ICS for all types of incidents no matter the size, location, or
responding organizations (Buck et al, 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Therefore, research
into how well the derailments’ incident- and organizational-specific characteristics align
with those thought to promote the use of NIMS/ICS as the IMS is needed. This research
may help close the gap and facilitate the use of NIMS/ICS for these types of responses.
Chapter III details the methodology.

Chapter III. Methodology
Background of Research Method
This study was conducted to compare the incident- and organizational-specific
characteristics of bulk crude oil derailments that result in a spill with the characteristics
found by researchers including Buck et al. (2006) and Jensen and Waugh (2014) that
enable the effective use of NIMS/ICS during a response. The research method employed
was qualitative with a descriptive case study design using semi-structured interviews.
This method, which is often selected for topic areas that not already well researched,
collects data through interviews, newspaper articles, and investigative reports (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2013). Additionally, a review is typically performed of past and present factors
that shape the issues regarding the selected topic area so that others may be better
equipped to form their own conclusions as to the findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013).
Rationale for Selected Method
A review of the literature revealed that the suitability of NIMS/ICS for use during
derailments had not been examined. Furthermore, due to the recency of bulk crude oil
derailments, there was no literature on the characteristics or response operations of bulk
crude oil derailments. There was literature on the characteristics of an incident and the
response organization that made implementing and using NIMS/ICS more likely to be
effective as an IMS. Therefore, a qualitative approach using a case study design was
chosen as the method as it allowed examination of the issues surrounding bulk crude oil
derailments and the use of NIMS/ICS. Interviews with railroad personnel provided
insights to the issues faced by railroads when planning for and responding to derailments.
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Research Processes
Responses to bulk crude oil derailments were researched by using National
Transportation Safety Board and Federal Railroad Administration investigative reports
and governmental after action reports. Interviews were performed with five full-time
Class I railroad hazmat and/or environmental employees who had responded to a crude
oil derailment resulting in an oil spill in the past five years. Participants were solicited by
email; of the seven railroad personnel representing three of the Class I railroads
contacted, five either agreed to be interviewed or arranged for another railroad employee
to be interviewed on behalf of the organization. These three Class I railroads were
chosen because they are headquartered in the United States and have had at least one bulk
crude oil derailment in the time frame investigated. The interviews, which were
conducted telephonically, assessed the characteristics of the incident and responding
organizations and issues railroads have faced with implementing NIMS/ICS. The names
and organizations of all participants were kept confidential.
Information gathered from railroad personnel interviews was merged with data
retrieved from federal investigative and after action reports to provide a more complete
picture of incident characteristics, response operations, and the use of NIMS/ICS.
Analysis for this study entailed categorizing the incident and response data gathered
during the research and interviews into two groups. The first data group was used to
describe the characteristics of the four representative derailments. The second data group
compared factors thought to enable the use of NIMS/ICS with findings from each of the
four representative derailments. From this compiled data, four major themes were found
and expounded upon in Chapters IV and V.
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Institutional Review Board
Arkansas Tech University’s Institutional Review Board approved this study prior
to solicitation of railroad personnel to participate in the study. Before each interview, the
participant was read the consent form (Appendix B) which included information on the
purpose of the study, the rights of the participant to withdraw information or stop the
interview at any time, and verification that each person understood that the interview was
voluntary. Upon verbal consent, the electronically signable form was emailed to each
participant.
Protection of Participant Rights
Due to the recency of the issue being studied and the fact that most of the
incidents are still under investigation and/or litigation, the participants were assured
confidentiality. None of the interviews were recorded; rather, hand-written notes were
taken during the interview process and compiled as summary data electronically with all
names removed. Materials were maintained in a private, locked office. All
documentation, both hand-written and electronic, will be destroyed upon publication of
this study.
Rigor and Credibility
In addition to the literature search, data concerning the incident- and
organizational-specific characteristics was obtained through phone interviews with five
participants from three of the seven Class I railroads that operate in the United States.
Each of the participants was in the Hazmat or Environmental Department within his or
her respective railroad and performed emergency response operations. Railroad first
responders were chosen as participants due to their experience and firsthand knowledge
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of the issues faced by railroad and other first responders. Moreover, each participant had
responded to derailments involving crude oil. Four of the five participants had responded
to bulk crude oil derailments occurring on unit trains; one had responded to a mixed
freight train derailment that involved crude oil. Interviews were reviewed to acquire
factual data about the derailments that could not be found through open source
information and to obtain their perspectives on NIMS/ICS and the challenges they have
had with adopting and implementing its use for derailments of bulk crude oil.
Summary
This chapter covered the methods used to obtain information on the
characteristics of crude oil derailments and the perspectives of railroad first responders on
adopting and using NIMS/ICS as their IMS. The qualitative research method was chosen
due to the recency of bulk crude oil derailments and the absence of research as to the
incident or response characteristics and the suitability of NIMS/ICS for derailments of
bulk crude oil planning and response operations. Before interviews were performed,
approval was obtained through the University’s Institutional Review Board to use human
subjects, and each subject was verbally instructed upon and agreed to an informed
consent form. Chapter IV contains the results of this study.

IV. Results
Overview
Interviews were granted by five hazmat and environmental personnel from three
Class I railroads. The interviews were semi-structured using the aforementioned topic
areas to guide the discussion (see Appendix A for list of questions). Of the 12 crude bulk
oil derailments (from 2010–2015) that resulted in a spill, four were examined more
closely. These four were chosen based on the ability to obtain factual data on the
incident or the ability of the involved railroad to discuss response operations. It should
be noted, though, that many of the participants were reticent to discuss details about a
particular derailment as most of the incidents are still under investigation and may have
related litigation pending. Research into investigative reports and governmental findings
found few public documents despite the high level of the public interest. The lack of data
may be attributable to the relative recency of bulk crude oil derailments and the
complexity of the investigative process; it is not for lack of federal interest—each
incident has been investigated by the FRA and/or NTSB. Nevertheless, the final reports
have only been published for two incidents (FRA: Mount Carbon, West Virginia, 2015;
NTSB: Lynchburg, Virginia, 2014). Despite these obstacles, all participants openly
discussed the issue of using NIMS/ICS during response operations and their efforts to
improve existing emergency preparedness and relationships with first responders, state
and federal regulatory agencies, and the affected communities.
Each interview was performed telephonically and lasted approximately one hour.
Notes were taken by the researcher and summarized electronically. There were four
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major themes that arose from the interviews: (1) derailments of crude oil have very
similar properties and require similar response strategies; (2) railroad hazmat and
environmental teams are finding strict adherence to NIMS/ICS difficult; (3) first
responders not affiliated with the railroads have limited knowledge on how to respond to
derailments and the risks involved; and (4) railroads are working hard to build
relationships and train responders—efforts that have already paid off.
The interviews focused on three incidents—Lynchburg, Virginia (April 2014);
Galena, Illinois (March 2015); and Heimdal, North Dakota (May 2015). Additionally,
using the FRA accident report, the incident that occurred at Mount Carbon, West Virginia
(February 2015), was examined. These four derailments represent the range of incidentspecific characteristics evident in the 12 derailments, including location, proximity to
urban areas and sensitive habitats, incident severity, and complexity of the response
operations. The table in Appendix C summarizes these characteristics while the table in
Appendix D compares the NIMS/ICS enabling incident-specific characteristics to each of
the four derailments. Organizational-specific characteristics, including senior leadership
commitment, shared vision, and the level of pre-incident preparedness and training were
discussed; however, due to the sensitive nature of the topics, the limited number
participants and representative railroads, and the subjective nature of the information,
these characteristics were not included in the Appendix D table. These characteristics are
discussed collectively in the Findings.
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Findings
Similar properties and response strategies. Responses to crude oil derailments
typically follow a pattern similar to that of other hazmat derailments regardless of the
incident’s unique characteristics or the railroad involved, according to each participant
interviewed. Key operations performed by the railroads and their contractors center on
characterizing the site, containing the fire, stabilizing impacted railcars, removing
residual product, containing the oil spilled, recovering the oil from the environment,
removing debris, repairing track, and remediating the environment. One participant
noted that his railroad has a standard strategy used by their contractors and response
personnel. To support these operations, participants stated that each of their railroads has
an in-house hazmat response team on-call at all times. In addition to these teams,
participants noted that railroads contract the services of emergency responders, wreckers
and heavy machinery operators, oil spill removal organizations, and environmental
remediation companies. Each participant described the depth and breadth of contracted
resources available to the railroads when there is an incident, each with contracts in place
to provide services immediately upon notification.
Because responding to derailments of crude oil is similar to those involving other
hazardous flammable materials, each participant felt prepared to respond. The data
collected from the interviews did not indicate that response operations in rural locations
have more difficulties than urban ones; there did not appear to be a correlation as the
railroads bring in their own contractors, equipment, and subject matter experts no matter
the location. Rather, the difference that was evident was the level of trust or prior
relationships the railroad had with the local, state, or federal officials. One participant
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noted that when the local fire department allowed the railroad and their contractors to
work while keeping the Fire Chief (as Incident Commander) informed, that the response
went smoothly and quickly. Similarly, another participant noted that when they were
faced with a derailment in a city where they had done previous training with the fire
department and hazmat team, that the local responders trusted the railroad to take the best
actions and respond appropriately. That trust enabled the railroad to complete operations
expeditiously and enabled responders to use a modified planning process where Incident
Action Plans were updated and revised by the unified command as needed using a verbal
approval process. This flexibility allowed the Incident Action Plan to keep pace with
operations and prevented operations from being held up by the planning cycle.
Trust is not a given, however, for the railroad hazmat teams—they are often faced
with personnel who think they are “criminals” or worse. A participant remarked that in
one state an official told him that if there was a spill that they would “shut the railroad
down for at least 30 days,” an action that would likely hurt the Nation just as much as the
railroad. Each participant had experienced distrust before, and a few noted that tensions
appeared when government officials, who had no previous experience with derailment
response operations or the railroads, responded and inserted themselves in the response.
For example, on one derailment, government officials, uneasy with the response actions
of the railroad and distrustful of their intentions, slowed the response down, formed a
robust incident command structure, and only relaxed their hold when they felt that they
understood and could support the operations.
In order to change this perception, one railroad is focused on developing response
plans collaboratively with state and federal officials to ensure that their needs are

44
understood and met. Another railroad is focusing efforts on training first responders and
state and federal officials on the hazards posed by the different types of crude oils, how to
respond if there is an incident, and what the railroad does to prepare for the worst-case
scenario. Their training program, according to the participant, is as much about outreach
as it is education. Through their training school and hands-on training site, outreach
training for fire departments, mobile “Safety Train,” and free online training programs for
first responders, they have reached thousands of responders.
Adherence to NIMS/ICS. The railroad personnel interviewed all indicated that
they used an IMS akin to that of fire departments, but none of them felt that NIMS/ICS,
as it is formally defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is
effective for all of their operations. Several participants noted that they thought that
NIMS/ICS is useful and needed, but that it is most suited for large incidents where there
are numerous response agencies and personnel and communication over long distances is
critical. From what several participants said, they formed this belief after seeing it work
for responses including Hurricane Katrina and Deepwater Horizon but had experienced
only difficulties when they used it during their relatively small responses. This opinion
has been reinforced when they have had to work with state and federal officials who
imposed a rigid interpretation of NIMS/ICS on their response operations, thereby
interrupting the flow and hindering the response efforts.
Standing up an Incident Command Post and filling it with personnel in
accordance with the standard organizational chart takes a lot of time, as noted by one
participant. He added that by the time the organization is stood up that railroad
responders are usually winding down their response operations and moving into the
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longer term remediation phase of the operation. He sees the governmental agencies as
uncomfortable with the response operations (due to lack of familiarity) which causes
them to bring more people with them than they may actually need, making the command
post and incident management team an “entity of their own.” He felt that the
governmental agencies are more focused on the rules and processes than the operations or
the people involved in those operations. A possible reason for this misalignment, he
stated, was that the railroads—unlike the maritime industry—have not been planning,
exercising, or using NIMS/ICS since the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA 90)4. He felt that the federal government’s expectations of them have been too
ambitious given they are 20 years behind the oil companies in planning, exercises, and
drills in accordance with OPA 90—the criteria to which they are being held. This
thought was expressed by another participant as well.
The railroads are learning from these experiences what the expectations and needs
are for the state and federal agencies and have begun to make changes to how they plan
for and respond to incidents. As an example, two railroads are working with NIMS/ICS
consultants to assess their needs and build an IMS platform complete with training and
exercises to implement a company-wide program. Aspects of one program include
NIMS/ICS facilitators to accompany responders, developing rail-specific exercises,
providing classroom training for their personnel and contractors, and conducting joint
drills and exercises with local responders, state, and Federal On-Scene Coordinators.

4

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), which was created from Public Law 101-380 and codified in 33
U.S.C. §2701, amended the existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Clean Water Act. OPA 90
strengthened laws to prevent the discharge of oil into waters of the United States and the requirements for
notification, contingency planning, removal, and environmental remediation.
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Limited knowledge of non-railroad personnel. Of the four incidents examined,
in three of them participants indicated that the local first responders had little to no
experience or training in how to respond to a derailment of crude oil or what the potential
risks were from the product. Fortunately, in none of the cases were any of the responders
injured. Resources including the Emergency Response Planning Guide had been used to
establish an exclusion (or hot) zone with a wide margin of safety. One participant noted
that the fire department had training prior to the incident through the Transportation
Community Awareness and Emergency Response (TransCAER) program and, because of
that training, the Fire Chief increased the safety distance from the burning tank cars and
waited for the railroad’s hazmat team to arrive. Likewise, another fire department had
been through training with the railroad not long before the incident, and it was believed
that the Fire Chief felt more confident about being a part of the railroad’s operations due
to that training.
When asked if it was problem for the railroad hazmat teams to work with
inexperienced local first responders, there were no concerns as they had worked together
well and had maintained solid communication. One participant stated that the Fire Chief,
as the Incident Commander, wanted to be kept in the loop on decisions and have regular
meetings, but that he was comfortable with the railroad leading the response operations.
The lack of knowledge had been an issue, however, when it was the state or federal
officials who did not know how to assess the risk or control the situation. A participant
noted several encounters with inexperienced Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs),
each with a very different outcome. During one response operation, the FOSC stood
aside and allowed the railroad to respond while on another occasion the FOSC nearly
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stopped operations in order to get his bearings. Lack of knowledge, it was believed, led
to fear and uncertainty which drove that FOSC’s decisions.
Working hard to build relationships. Every participant enthusiastically
discussed the efforts being made by their organization to develop in-house capabilities for
incident management and provide training for first responders and government officials
on the hazards associated with crude oil derailments. They also discussed what the
railroads are doing to mitigate and control the hazards, and the detailed, location-specific
Geographic Response Plans that they are developing to complement their existing
emergency response plans.
The focus of one of the railroads is to “start right” meaning that its goal is to build
an IMS program that can work for every incident to ensure the responders get off to the
best start possible. The initial concept is to build a core team of five to six personnel who
are experts in NIMS/ICS and have them deploy with the hazmat response team to
implement the ICS process from the very moment they begin their response. This
Incident Management Team (IMT) would be modeled off existing IMTs, including
FEMA’s IMT, but would be supplemented with additional private sector NIMS/ICS
experts who could relieve them or be a part of the command structure if needed after the
initial assessment is made. In addition to building the IMT, this railroad has begun
higher level NIMS/ICS team training for their personnel, response contractors, and
consultants in order to build relationships and expertise amongst their response force. In
conjunction with this team training, exercises and drills are being developed to train
personnel on the issues encountered during a derailment. These exercises are being
designed and executed with the collaboration of the local responders and state and federal
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representatives in order to ensure everyone’s exercise objective is met and to build
stronger networks.
Another railroad has focused on training first responders, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and USCG FOSCs and their staffs, and their own contractors
and consultants on how to respond to a derailment of crude oil. One main issue the
railroad has encountered is the misconception that all crude oils are alike when in fact
every batch is different, and the physical properties make some oils more hazardous than
others. This railroad’s outreach includes providing, free of charge, classroom training to
fire departments and hazmat teams, instruction for all responders and government
officials at their in-house training center which contains a hands-on field portion,
availability of a mobile training platform (Safety Train), online training curriculum, and
support of the Association of American Railroad’s training center, Transportation
Technology Center, Inc., in Pueblo, Colorado. It was noted that their outreach efforts in
2015 resulted in 6,000 personnel being trained.
The third railroad’s focus is on outreach to emergency managers and first
responders through the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) throughout their
operating area. Railroad representatives attend LEPC meetings where preparedness
activities are performed, provide first responders continuous education and training
through programs including TransCAER, Safety Train, and the Transportation
Technology Center, Inc., and participate in numerous exercises and drills with its spill
management team. Additionally, exercises involving state and federal emergency
managers and responders are developed and executed approximately 40 times a year,
thereby expanding their outreach to all levels of government.
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Summary
The five interviews revealed common themes uniting the experiences and
opinions of railroad first responders. The first major theme discovered was that railroads
followed a pattern when responding to derailments of hazmat and that the pattern did not
change substantially for derailments involving bulk crude oil. The railroad first
responders and their contracted support personnel understood the operations that needed
to be performed and in which order. Left as the primary response force, railroads were
equipped and prepared to respond to derailments with little to no support from outside
agencies. However, when outside agencies became involved and inserted themselves in
to the decision making, as was done when a unified command was stood up, operations
were often inhibited until everyone was comfortable with the operations.
The second major theme found was that how formally NIMS/ICS was used
determined how well it was able to be implemented at the time of the incident. All
participants indicated familiarity with NIMS/ICS but felt that modifying it to fit the
circumstances and size of the incident made its use feasible. Strict adherence to the IMS
appeared to lead to creating large incident management teams independent of the
incident’s actual need. Likewise, strict adherence was seen as slowing down the process,
especially during the emergency phase, when operations begin and end quickly.
The third theme uncovered the lack of experience first responders outside of the
railroad have with derailments, in particular those involving bulk crude oil. Statistically,
due to the 160,000 miles of track and the relatively few incidents that occur, this was not
unexpected. The railroad participants all indicated, though, that the lack of first
responder experience was not an issue as long as they took initial actions according to the
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Emergency Response Guide or used the information provided by the railroad. In fact,
fire departments appeared to defer to the expertise of the railroads when involved in an
incident which enabled the railroad responders to act swiftly and decisively.
The fourth and final theme was that of introducing new programs or reviving old
ones to build partnerships with communities as well as regulatory agencies. All of the
participants discussed the actions their railroads were doing to move forward with
adopting and implementing NIMS/ICS, preparedness initiatives, and cross-organizational
training. All of their programs were geared towards building relationships or renewing
existing ones so that their first encounter with other responding agencies was not when
there was a derailment. Collectively, these themes uncover the challenges but also shed
light on potential opportunities that may both improve the railroads’ use of NIMS/ICS
and lay the foundation for a solid response network in the future. Chapter V follows with
a discussion of the findings and recommendations for future studies.

V. Discussion
Introduction
Due to the surge in hydraulic-fracturing around 2009, railroads have had to
increase exponentially, year after year, the amount of bulk crude oil they transport across
the United States (Association of American Railroads, 2015d). The crude oils they haul,
however, have a range of chemical and physical properties with some of the oils
containing above average concentrations of dissolved gases which makes them light
crude oils (National Response Team, 2014). These light crude oils behave more like fuel
oils and are prone to ignite if there is a sudden release during a derailment (National
Response Team, 2014). The potential hazards associated with the transportation of bulk
crude oil (especially the light crude oils) gained national attention after the LacMégantic, Quebec, derailment in Canada in 2013 caused the massive destruction of a
town and took the lives of 47 people (Kolpack & MacPherson, 2013; Nelson, 2013;
Vartabedian, 2015; Wronski, 2015).
With the additional attention, federal and state emergency responders and
regulators have begun to oversee crude oil derailment response operations more closely
and oftentimes expect the railroad personnel to use the same IMS they use—NIMS/ICS
(Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2014). The railroads have not
historically used NIMS/ICS as formally as the public response agencies and have found
its adoption and implementation to be challenging. The railroad culture is to use their
own, streamlined IMS, operate quickly with few personnel, and contract the services of
wreckers, hazmat responders, and safety, health, and environmental consultants. The
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additional push by governmental agencies to use NIMS/ICS for incidents appears, to the
railroad, to slow down response operations.
The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the incident- and
organizational-specific characteristics of planning for and responding to bulk crude oil
cargo derailments to see how well they aligned with the characteristics found by
researchers including Buck et al. (2006) and Jensen and Waugh (2014) that enable the
use of NIMS/ICS. This research will inform the field of Emergency Management
because it characterizes incident- and organizational-specific characteristics pertaining to
bulk crude oil derailments and uncovers potential difficulties in using NIMS/ICS during
these types of derailments. This data may be used to fill the gaps in understanding which
features of NIMS/ICS are suitable for use during a crude oil derailment response and
which ones should be further investigated. Once understood, the gaps can be addressed,
thereby enabling railroads, first responders, and local, state, and federal governmental
agencies to implement NIMS/ICS more effectively and collaboratively.
Derailments in the United States during 2010–2015 that resulted in a spill were
considered as the boom in hydraulic-fracturing did not begin until around 2009; however,
no incidents fit this description until 2013. From 2013–2015 there were 12 incidents, but
only two of them had their formal governmental investigative reports available to the
public. To fill the data gaps and to gain perspective from the railroads that had been
involved in an incident, interviews were conducted with five hazmat and environmental
personnel from three Class I railroads. The interviews were semi-structured and followed
a line of questioning to uncover incident- and organizational-specific characteristics
relating to recent events. Four incidents were included in the results.
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The literature review found numerous incident-specific characteristics thought to
enable the use of NIMS/ICS. Incident-specific characteristics included sufficient
responder resources, responders trained and experienced in the type of incident, previous
collaboration and coordination of response agencies, low incident complexity, and low
risk response operations. These characteristics along with several others were compared
with the four examined incidents and are summarized in Appendix D. Organizationalspecific characteristics were not included in the table but were summarized in the
Findings.
Discussion
Four themes emerged from the research and the interviews, and they were (1)
derailments of crude oil have very similar properties and require similar response
strategies; (2) railroad hazmat and environmental teams are finding strict adherence to
NIMS/ICS difficult; (3) first responders not affiliated with the railroads have limited
knowledge on how to respond to derailments and the risks involved; and (4) railroads are
working hard to build relationships and train responders. There is overlap between the
themes with the overarching theme being that there are common concerns about using
NIMS/ICS among railroad hazmat and environmental responders, but that each of these
railroads is working to implement NIMS/ICS as their IMS. Using the incident- and
organizational-specific characteristics thought to enable the use of NIMS/ICS discussed
in Chapter II, this section discusses how the response- and agent-generated demands
faced by the railroads during crude oil derailments may be addressed.
Similar properties and response strategies. Despite the differences in types of
cargos, locations, and the responding organizations involved, railroads have similar
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strategies and protocols for responding to derailments of bulk crude oil that result in a
spill with or without a fire and/or explosion. For the three incidents discussed during the
interviews, each participant felt that the railroad was well prepared and equipped to
respond no matter the circumstances involved. Even though the hauling of bulk shale
crude oil is relatively new, as far as the quantities being shipped, each railroad has moved
bulk hazmat since their inception. Their training and expertise in responding to hazmat,
many of which also pose fire and explosion hazards, appears to have enabled them to
transition seamlessly to responding to spills of bulk crude oils, even the more flammable
ones.
Perhaps unique to the railroad industry, due to their extensive network of 160,000
miles of track and the oftentimes remote locations where they operate, railroads
ordinarily operate autonomously when there is an emergency, calling upon preselected
and trained contractors and consultants to support operations (Association of American
Railroads, 2016a). This history of independence seems to not have been often
questioned, however, until recently with the increased public’s interest in the shipping of
bulk crude oil by rail and the subsequent governmental involvement during response
operations. Moreover, federal and state governmental oversight increases considerably
when the crude oil impacts or has the risk of impacting waters of the United States due to
the OPA 90 regulations.
The potential negative impacts of this oversight appear to vary and depends on the
external parties, not on the railroad involved or incident complexity, severity, or
proximity to a large population. Key to the successfulness of the response operations and
ability to use NIMS/ICS effectively, according to the findings, appears to be the

55
preexisting trust and respect of the local responders and the organizations’ willingness to
“modify” NIMS/ICS process to meet the operational demands—response-generated
factors that, so far, appear to be inconsistent. This finding is supported by the data as
shown in the Appendix D comparison table. In three of the four derailments, local first
responders were not trained for derailments, the railroad personnel had not worked
previously with the first responders, and no prior coordination had occurred. These
factors appear to have hindered joint operations more than the incidents’ level of
complexity, severity, or number of emergent organizations.
These findings suggest that if railroads can network with local, state, and federal
emergency managers and responders and if they can train first responders on crude oil
derailment operations, they may be able to close the IMS gaps created by these issues.
For example, railroads may be able to use the similarities in response operations to build
upon NIMS/ICS enabling factors including creating a shared vision, building trust, and
reducing uncertainty and complexity (Buck et al., 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014;
Moynihan, 2009). One possibility is to have the railroads create universal, template
Incident Action Plans for derailments of crude oil. These plans would not address all of
the incident-specific response- or agent-generated demands created during a derailment,
but they may be able to cover a majority of the ones found at most incidents including the
strategies, tactics, work assignments and tasks, and communication systems [responsegenerated], and type of materials involved [agent-generated]. These plans could then be
reviewed by other response agencies to confirm their understanding and agreement. If
possible, for high risk locations, risk assessments and plans could be developed
collaboratively with local, state, and federal resources included, and incorporated into

56
existing local emergency response plans. This effort would put into practice the finding
that collective preplanning leads to NIMS/ICS working more effectively (Buck et al.,
2006).
Additionally, railroads may be able to leverage the property and response
similarities of crude oil derailments by continuing to develop and offer training and
education programs for first responders. Training first responders takes time and
resources. By expanding on current emergency response training programs to include the
hazards and response tactics unique to crude oil derailments, railroads may be able to
facilitate the integration of new information into existing educational material. Similarly,
training may be used to demonstrate how well planned and executed railroad response
operations are. These efforts may build the trust and gain the confidence of other
response organizations, which are key NIMS/ICS enabling factors (Jensen & Waugh,
2014).
Adherence to NIMS/ICS. Railroads have independently developed an IMS that
meets their needs, and although it resembles NIMS/ICS in overall organization, the
planning process it follows appears to be less rigid than the IMS imposed by federal and
state regulators during recent events. The railroad IMS is streamlined and starts with the
assumption that they will need to be self-supporting. Railroad responders’ plans account
for support from local fire departments but do not depend on it, as many past derailments
have occurred in remote areas where the fire department is entirely staffed by volunteers
with limited training in handling derailments, or where the fire department is physically
unable to reach the incident site.
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It may appear that the need to be self-sufficient created a culture of independence
within the railroads that makes integrating into an external command and control
structure difficult for them. However, the interviews did not indicate that this was a
factor. For the railroads, the need to use a prescribed IMS does not seem to be the main
hurdle; it appears, rather, that their lack of experience and preplanning using NIMS/ICS
has hindered its successful adoption and implementation. Compounding this problem is
that NIMS/ICS is only required when governmental agencies join the response and form
a unified command. Because this currently only occurs when there is an actual or
potential spill of oil into waters of the United States, railroads may not employ
NIMS/ICS for every emergency response operation.
As noted in Chapter II, researchers have found many characteristics thought to
enable the use of NIMS/ICS, including a strong organizational commitment to
NIMS/ICS, support of transformational leaders, and a system in place to employ
NIMS/ICS in planning, training, and exercises (Jensen & Waugh, 2014; Lester, 2007;
Moynihan, 2008a; Perry, 2003). Employing these factors may support the railroads as
they work towards strengthening their adherence to NIMS/ICS and building their external
relationships. For example, railroads may want to reconsider when they use NIMS/ICS
and begin implementing it for all incidents. This would be a paradigm shift for several of
the railroads who indicated that, contrary to the researchers’ findings (Ansell et al., 2010;
Buck et al., 2006), from what they had seen NIMS/ICS was best suited for large, complex
incidents, expanding over large geographical areas, including Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
This perception may stem from the limited number of times that the railroads
have been required to use NIMS/ICS by the governmental agencies and the infrequency
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in which crude oil derailments occur. Railroads, having worked predominantly in the
past with fire departments that appear to also have their own, streamlined form of
NIMS/ICS, have typically found collaboration with the local responders seamless as both
parties tend to be flexible, a factor found by Moynihan (2008b) to foster trust among
responders. Moving into a large, multi-agency command structure where rules are rigidly
enforced seems to add layers and complexity to what is otherwise considered by the
railroad personnel a straight-forward operation. More importantly, the use of a multiagency unified command, so far, appears to slow down the process, adding risk. There
may be some truth to the observation—a lack of experience using NIMS/ICS by the
railroads may be perceived as incompetence by the governmental responders, resulting in
the governmental representatives feeling the need to insert themselves even further into
the response operations.
Railroad senior leaders need to become involved, though, if the expectation is to
use NIMS/ICS, as resources are needed to develop NIMS/ICS-compliant plans, training,
and exercises. Furthermore, in order to maintain skill competency and confidence,
railroads will likely need to build a comprehensive system to ensure all elements of the
program are developed, maintained, and used for all incidents—a necessary step,
according to Jensen and Waugh (2014), if leadership desires personnel to achieve and
maintain expertise. Using NIMS/ICS for all response operations should hone their skills
and improve their proficiency as well. Next, contractors and consultants, as needed,
should be trained and begin using NIMS/ICS regularly to ensure the railroad IMT has
sufficient personnel depth. Eventually, railroads may consider including public sector
organizations and governmental agencies in their planning, training, and exercises in
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order to build relationships and trust, coordinate plans, and to begin to agree upon
response strategies and tactics. Use of the aforementioned NIMS/ICS-compliant Incident
Action Plans may bolster these efforts.
Limited knowledge of non-railroad personnel. Just as the railroad’s lack of
experience in using NIMS/ICS has made collaboration with some external responding
organizations more tenuous, so has the lack of experience in responding to train
derailments by those organizations. Inexperience appears to become an issue primarily
when state and/or federal command personnel do not trust the responding railroad
personnel or want to become more familiar with strategies and tactics before Incident
Action Plans are approved. Researchers have found that when responders are not
familiar with the response operations and have not had incident-specific training,
implementing NIMS/ICS is difficult (Buck et al., 2006; Jensen & Waugh, 2014). Further
diminishing the effectiveness of NIMS/ICS is the need to perform new tasks within a
new, emergent organization (Lutz & Lindell, 2008). Although, some of the impetus to
train outside responders lies with the railroads, local, state, and federal responders should
be equally held accountable to learn these types of response operations if public
responders could be involved.
This finding opens opportunities for the railroads to network and create
partnerships with other response organizations and governmental agencies—activities
found to enable NIMS/ICS (Jensen & Waugh, 2014). For example, developing strategies
and tactics and decision-making protocols are two response-generated demands that can
be performed collaboratively by all response organizations prior to an incident. Response
organizations and governmental agencies may find that working with the railroads to
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understand their existing emergency response plans, standard operating procedures, and
safety systems enables them to support operations immediately upon arrival.
Not only do the railroads need to take into account the needs of the local
community in their plans, the state and local plans need to address derailments. To
support this endeavor, the railroads should continue their outreach using tools including
TransCAER and the Safety Train, perform outreach to federal agencies through the
regional offices in the states where they operate, educate other responders on their
operations, offer no- or low-cost training, and jointly plan and exercise response plans.
These efforts may build the competence and confidence of local, state, and federal first
responders, thereby reducing the incident’s complexity and uncertainty and enabling
NIMS/ICS to be more effective (Buck et al., 2006).
Working hard to build relationships. As seen by a few of the railroad
personnel interviewed, not all of the other response organizations trust that the railroads
will respond to a derailment with the interests of the community or environment in mind.
Although none of the research has indicated that railroad responders do not keep public
safety and environmental health a first priority, when governmental first responders
distrust the railroads, response operations appear to be impeded, as does the formation of
an effective IMS. Compounding this distrust may be the fear that the derailment will
cause a fire or explosion putting the safety and health of the community and local
responders at risk. State and federal agencies, because they have not worked with the
railroads before, may be unfamiliar with their established response strategies and suspect
their “agenda.” Furthermore, without previous experience and understanding of railroad
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operations, response activities may appear to these agencies to be rushed and unorganized
and, therefore, unsafe.
Because of the nearly universal lack of familiarity with railroad response
operations for responders outside of the railroad community, each participant discussed
the ways in which his/her railroad is reaching out to public organizations and
governmental agencies to build stronger relationships. The railroads have employed
different but overlapping techniques including developing hands-on and online training
materials, networking at meetings and conferences, developing and holding multi-agency
exercises, and reaching out to local experts to develop Geographic Response Plans. In
order to “start right,” each railroad is taking action to improve relationships with
stakeholders and other response organizations and is updating response plans and training
programs to include the possible establishment of a NIMS/ICS command structure during
future incidents.
The railroads’ efforts are backed by research which has found that the use of
NIMS/ICS is enhanced when there is a high level of trust and prior planning or
networking between responding organizations, an understanding by the responders of the
incident hazards and how to respond, and incident-specific training (Bennett, 2011;
Jensen & Waugh, 2014; Moody, 2010; Perry, 2003). Expanding on these efforts,
railroads may find that working with regional EPA and USCG Sector offices builds
relationships and creates a shared vision with the federal agencies most likely to oversee
response operations and dictate the style in which NIMS/ICS is used. Trust from the
federal agencies involved may lead to trust from the state and local representatives.
Resource and time allowing, railroads may also consider expanding first responder
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outreach to state agencies, including those that govern environmental quality and natural
resources, as they may be represented within the command structure. These initiatives
appear to be in the direction desired by the federal government as they are similar to the
National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines (Department
of Homeland Security/United States Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Transportation/Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
& Department of the Interior/Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, 2016)
developed post-OPA 90 by several federal agencies to help industry understand their
requirements. If this is the case, railroads should be in-line with possible upcoming
changes to existing regulations and able to collaborate more directly with USCG and
EPA, the two main agencies that use PREP.
Methodological Insights
There were several challenges with this study with the main one being the ability
to obtain objective information about the incident- and organizational-specific
characteristics of bulk crude oil derailments. Due to the recency of the issue and their
infrequency, only two of the federal investigations had been completed and were
available for review. With respect to the railroads, all but one of the incidents discussed
by the participants were still under investigation or had pending litigation which
restricted their ability to give incident preparedness and response details or personal
opinions. This lack of information reformed the emphasis of the study which broadened
from a direct comparison of characteristics, to obtaining a better understanding of how
railroads can work towards implementing NIMS/ICS more effectively. Should this type
of study be reconsidered, expanding the scope to include similar incidents (e.g.,
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derailments of hazmat) may produce more comprehensive data as they occur more
frequently, have occurred over a longer period of time, and there are numerous federal
investigative reports available to the public.
Another challenge encountered included obtaining interviews from Class I
railroad responders due to their limited numbers and time constraints. All of the
personnel reached graciously agreed to be interviewed or were able to provide another
representative. One of the responders interviewed had not responded to a bulk crude oil
derailment, but had been on several hazmat incidents and was knowledgeable about the
issues surrounding the railroads’ use of NIMS/ICS for derailments. Future studies may
consider also interviewing non-railroad affiliated personnel who have responded to crude
oil derailments to add depth and breadth to the findings.
Recommendations for Future Study
This study considered how NIMS/ICS enabling incident- and organizationalspecific characteristics align with those found at derailments of bulk crude oil, but did not
fully answer how to use the findings of which characteristics were misaligned to close the
IMS gaps. Broad recommendations were made as to how the railroads can network and
support first responders and local, state, and federal governmental agencies as they
prepare for and respond to derailments, but it is unknown if these actions will facilitate
the use of NIMS/ICS during the response. Past research indicates that these are the steps
necessary to enable the use of NIMS/ICS, but until these steps have been completed, they
cannot be assessed.
I recommend future study to track the efforts of the railroads as their processes
evolve to incorporate NIMS/ICS to see if they met their goals and objectives, and to
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determine which of the changes led to the most substantial improvement in their ability to
execute a crude oil derailment response operation using NIMS/ICS. This research should
start immediately as these findings show that the current governmental expectations are
for railroads to be able to use NIMS/ICS when there is derailment. Railroad emergency
managers and contingency planners may also consider working collectively within their
industry to create standardized organizational charts, template Incident Action Plans, and
training programs for first responders. These actions may reduce the uncertainty for first
responders and governmental agencies, thereby facilitating the use of NIMS/ICS.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to examine how well aligned the characteristics of a
bulk crude oil derailment resulting in a spill were with those found to enable the use
NIMS/ICS in order to understand and close the gaps preventing railroads from its
effective use. This purpose was partially achieved through interviews and case studies,
although objective information was limited, and participants were not at liberty to discuss
the details of many of the incidents. The research discovered that although there are
several incident-specific characteristics that make NIMS/ICS less suitable for responses
to bulk crude oil derailments, the railroads are pursuing its use due to governmental
oversight and the need to have a common IMS during multi-agency operations. Building
upon this data, future research is needed to determine which, if any, of the changes
railroads are implementing are improving the efficiency and efficacy of using NIMS/ICS
during derailments.
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Appendix A
Summary of Survey Questions
1. Incident demographics (incident is a derailment of crude oil that resulted in a spill or
release)
a. Date
b. Time
c. Location
d. Proximity to town and size of town
e. Incident features (Fire? Spill?)
f. Local jurisdictions for location
g. Severity of incident or overall risk (qualitative assessment)
h. Were the news media involved? How much? How long? Was press positive or
negative?
2. Response organizations
a. Who responded (organizations, agencies, NGOs, etc.) (Incident Command System
(ICS) organizational charts with agency/organization identification is fine)
b. Number and type of railroad responders (estimates are fine)
i.

Railroad personnel

ii.

Contractors

iii.

Consultants

iv.

Other?

3. Response operations
a. What tasks were performed? (e.g., ICS-204 forms)
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b. Did the response have an appropriate level and type of equipment needed?
c. Did the equipment arrive when needed or when expected?
4. Non-railroad (RR) technical knowledge
a. What was the technical knowledge (qualitative) of the non-RR affiliated
responders (e.g., fire, police, emergency medical services (EMS), U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ), etc.) on how to respond to a train derailment of
crude oil? (In other words, were they familiar with your response operations or
was this a new type of incident for them?)
b. Did the non-railroad affiliated organizations and agencies understand the hazards
and their associated risks?
c. Were the non-railroad affiliated organizations and agencies able to prioritize the
risks/threats accurately?
5. Was there an incident management system (IMS)? If yes – please describe (Was it the
National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) or
another IMS? Who was in the command? Was there a unified command? Was it
represented by state, local and/or federal agencies, etc.?)
6. Time/duration
a. Did the response operations or command grow over time? (e.g., Did more
responders or government representative appear as the incident progressed?)
b. How long did the emergency phase last?
c. How long did the recovery / remediation phase last?
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7. Planning
a. Prior to the incident had there been preplanning for derailments of bulk crude oil
shipments by the RR?
b. Prior to the incident had there been preplanning for derailments of crude oil or
hazmat by the RR with local response agencies or state agencies?
c. Prior to the incident had there been preplanning for derailments of crude oil or
hazmat by the RR with Federal agencies, including EPA, USCG, or Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)?
d. Prior to the incident, do you know if any local or state agencies had performed
preplanning for derailments of any type?
8. Inter-agency Climate
a. If non-RR organizations or governmental agencies were involved, did you feel
that there was trust or a shared vision between you and them?
b. If not immediately present, did the trust or shared vision grow as the response
operations matured? Describe climate of the operations.
9. Personnel Expertise and Experience
a. What was, prior to the incident, the level (subjective/qualitative) of NIMS/ICS
training, experience and expertise of the:
i. RR responders
ii. Local
iii. State
iv. Federal
v. Contractors and consultants
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b. Had the railroad responders performed drills or exercises using NIMS/ICS prior
to incident?
10. Does the railroad organization as a whole (from the most senior leaders down to the
field personnel) support the implementation and use of NIMS/ICS for all response
operations? Describe any programs, policies or procedures in place currently and if
applicable, plans going forward.
11. Any additional information about the incident or the railroad that would help in
understanding its characteristics or response operations.

Appendix B
Informed
Consent Form
Arkansas Tech
University

Title of Project: Responding to Train Derailments of Crude Oil Cargos and the Use of
NIMS/ICS
Principal Investigator: Laura Hartline Weems
Other Investigators: None
Participant’s Printed Name: _______________________________________
Section 1. Introduction
I am in graduate school at Arkansas Tech University and am performing research for my
thesis on derailments of bulk crude oil and the use of the National Incident Management
System and Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS).
The question that I am addressing with this research study is what are the incident and
organizational-specific characteristics of planning for and responding to derailments of
bulk crude oil that result in a spill or release.
The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of these responses and
compare them to the incident and organizational-specific characteristics found by
researchers to facilitate the use of NIMS/ICS, such as those found at marine oil spills.
The goal is to provide railroads and governmental agencies and organizations information
that can help them with planning for and responding to future derailments of bulk crude
oil.
Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. If you decide to participate,
you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time.
Likewise, at any time during the interview, you may choose to stop the interview or retract
information. Otherwise, completion of the survey indicates your consent to participate in
the survey. Your comments within this study will not be identified as your own.
Section 2. Procedures
This study is being performed by doing research and interviews with emergency
responders from the Class I railroads that operate in the United States. The focus is on
those railroads that have responded in the past 13 years to derailments of bulk cargos of
crude oil that resulted in a spill or release. You will be asked questions concerning the
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characteristics of planning for and responding to derailments of crude oil, and I will
transcribe those notes electronically.
This information will be combined with other case study information and details with
respect to the railroad(s) involved, names of interviewees or responders, or other
information that may disclose sensitive or personally identifiable information will be
removed.
Section 3. Time Duration of the Procedures and Study
If you agree to take part in this study, your involvement will last approximately one
to one and a half hours.
Section 4. Discomforts and Risks
There are no known risks associated with this study.
Section 5. Potential Benefits
1) Through this research, there is the possible benefit that railroad emergency
management and response personnel will obtain a better understanding of what incident
and organizational-specific characteristics are most suitable for using the National
Incident Command System / Incident Command System during an emergency response.
This information should provide railroad emergency planners and responders with a
better understanding of how the characteristics of crude oil derailment planning and
response operations make NIMS/ICS more or less suitable as their incident management
system. Having this knowledge should enable railroads to plan for and respond to
derailments in a manner that minimizes or eliminates the risks posed by misaligned
characteristics.
2) Likewise, through this research, there is the possible benefit that governmental
agencies and other organizations responding to derailments of crude oil will become
more familiar with the characteristics of bulk crude oil derailment response operations
and will obtain a better understanding of how these characteristics make NIMS/ICS more
or less suitable as an incident management system when responding. This knowledge
should assist these agencies and organizations in planning for and responding to
derailments of crude oil as they will have a more complete understanding of the incident
and organizational differences between a marine oil spill and a derailment of crude oil
and what obstacles the railroads face in using NIMS/ICS.
Section 6.

Statement of Confidentiality

Privacy and confidentiality measures
All research material, including hand written and electronic notes taken during interviews
will be kept on my personal, password-protected laptop computer or my file cabinet.
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Once the thesis has been approved by the committee, all interview files will be either
shredded or erased from any electronic media.
In the event of any publication or presentation resulting from the research, no
personally or organizational identifiable information will be shared.
The following people/groups may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research.

The Office of Human Research Protections in the U. S. Department of Health and
Human Services
 The Arkansas Tech University Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews
and approves research studies) and
 The Arkansas Tech University IRB Office
Section 7. Costs for Participation
There are no costs for participating in this study.
You will not lose any legal rights by consenting to be a participant.
Section 8. Compensation for Participation
You will not receive any compensation for being in this research study.
Section 9. Research Funding
No funding has been received to perform this research.
Section 10. Voluntary Participation
Taking part in this research study is voluntary. If you choose to take part in this
research, your major responsibility will include a phone interview. You do not have to
participate in this research. If you choose to take part, you have the right to stop at any
time.
Section 11. Contact Information for Questions or Concerns
You have the right to ask any questions you may have about this research. If you have
questions, complaints or concerns related to this research, contact Laura Weems at
501-425-5969 (mobile) or my advisor, Dr. Smith, at 479-498-6039 (office).
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant or you have
concerns or general questions about the research contact the research participant’s
protection advocate in the Arkansas Tech University’s IRB Office at (479) 9680319. You may also call this number if you cannot reach the research team or
wish to talk to someone else.
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For more information about participation in a research study and about the
Institutional Review Board (IRB), a group of people who review the research to
protect your rights, please visit Arkansas Tech University’s IRB web site at
https://www.atu.edu/research/human_subjects.php. Included on this web site, under
the heading “Participant Info,” you can access federal regulations and information
about the protection of human research participants. If you do not have access to the
internet, copies of these federal regulations are available by calling the Arkansas Tech
University office at (479) 968-0319.
Verbal Consent/Permission to be in the Research
Participant:
______________________
Name of Participant

_________________
_________
Date verbal consent given Time

Person Explaining the Research: Your signature below means that you have
explained the research to the participant/participant representative and have answered
any questions he/she has about the research.
______________________
Signature of person
who explained this research
_______________________
Printed Name

_______________
Date

______
Time

Appendix C
Summary of Incident-Specific Characteristics for Four Representative Derailments
Incident

2 – Galena,
IL

1- Heimdal,
ND

3 – Lynchburg, VA

4 - Mount Carbon,
WV

Characteristics
Population of impacted county (rounded)

4,000

22,000

55,000

46,000

Incident proximity in miles to urbanized
area5 within state (>50K)

124
(Bismarck, ND)

77
(Rockford, IL)

0
(Lynchburg, VA)

38
(Charleston, WV)

Incident proximity in miles to large
metropolitan area (>1M)

420
(Minneapolis, MN)

164
(Chicago, IL)

113
(Richmond, VA)

193
(Columbus, OH)

Had a derailment (of any hazmat or oil)
occurred within that county in the previous
decade

No

No

No

No

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

Complexity7 of incident response (low,
moderate or high)

High

High

High

High

Did incident response expand after initial
response

No

Yes

No

Yes

Small

Small

Small

Small

Severity6 of incident (low, moderate or high)

Size8 of incident (spatial)

5

As defined by the US Census Bureau
Severity is determined by the characteristics of the incident. Low is defined as spill or release only; moderate is a spill or release with a fire and no
injuries or illnesses or evacuations; high is a spill with a fire and explosion or injury/illness by residents or responders.
7
Complexity of incident response is relative to a typical oil spill response on land or water. Low complexity is where there are <4 major tasks; moderate
includes 5-8; high includes >8.
8
Using the “football field” analogy presented by one interviewee, small is less than two fields (<100K ft^2); medium is between two and 10 fields
(100K-500K ft^2); large is more than 10 fields (>500K ft^2)
6
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Appendix D

Incident
Characteristic

Availability of
local resources
for incident
type

Comparison of NIMS/ICS Enabling Factors to Four Derailments
NIMS/ICS Enabling
Finding:
Finding:
Finding:
Factor
Heimdal, ND
Galena, IL
Lynchburg, VA

Sufficient local
resources for incident

Finding:
Mount Carbon,
WV

Not Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Uniqueness of Having experienced
incident for
responders for
first responders incident type

Not present

Not present

Not present

Not Present

Having trained first
responders for
incident type

Not Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Responders worked or
trained together
previously

Not Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Few organizations
responding

Not present

Not present

Present

Not Present

Few emergent
organizations or
agencies

Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Multi-agency
response
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Prior coordination and
planning

Not Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Level of
complexity of
incident
response

Less complex
incidents

Highly complex

Highly complex

Highly
complex

Highly complex

Level of
severity or risk

Low risk, particularly
when pair with low
frequency

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

Expansion of
incident
response over
time

Response contracts
over time as tasks are
accomplished

Present

Not present

Present

Not present

Size of
incident

Smaller incidents

Small

Small

Small

Small

